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INTRODUCTION

For many people in the United States today, fatal bacterial
infections reside in our collective consciousness as mere ghosts of
history-problems of the past. This cultural amnesia is primarily due
to the discovery and widespread use of antibiotics.' But, the routine,
copious, and often unnecessary use of antibiotics has brought our
species to the threshold of a modem medical crisis: a return to the pre2
antibiotic past caused by antibiotic resistance.
In recent years, deaths caused by previously treatable bacterial
infections have been growing. 3 According to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), over twenty-thousand people die each
year from these infections, 4 and that number is on the rise. One

1. Infectious Diseases Soc'y of Am., Facts about Antibiotic Resistance,
IDSOCIETY.ORG, http://www.idsociety.org/ARFacts/#sthash.KvkrBQ9j.dpuf
(last
visited Apr. 26, 2015).
2. See discussion infra Part I.
3. Andrew Pollack, Rising Threat of Infections Unfazed by Antibiotics,
NYTIMES.COM,
http://www.nytimes.conV2010/02/27/business/27germ.html?_r=O
(Feb. 26, 2010). Recently, in 2015, an outbreak of an antibiotic resistant bacteria,
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceaeor "CRE" (a bacteria commonly found in
the digestive tract), occurred at UCLA's Ronald Reagan Medical Center in
California. See Jordan Rau, UCLA Outbreak Highlights Challenge of Curbing
Infections, NPR.ORG (published Feb. 20, 2015, 10:09 AM), available at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2015/02/20/387743352/ucla-outbreak-highlightschallenge-of-curbing-infections. Two patients died and over 100 more became ill as
a result of the outbreak. See id. "CRE is one of three kinds of infectious agents that
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention categorized as the drug-resistant
threats that require the most urgent monitoring and prevention. CRE bacteria are
resistant to almost all antibiotics, including carbapenems, which doctors often
deploy as a last resort. The remaining treatments are often toxic." Id.
4. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE
THREATS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
14
(2013),
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organism, methicillin-resistant Staphylococus Aures (MRSA), kills
more Americans every year than emphysema, HIV/AIDS, Parkinson's
disease, and homicide combined. 5
This phenomenon is called
antibiotic resistance; the cause of this alarming trend is multifaceted
and complex. 6 Misuse and overuse of antibiotics by physicians
coupled with a lag in new drug development combine to create a
perfect storm for antibiotic resistance, 7 which is a natural consequence
of the use of antibiotics. 8 The combination of these factors also
presents potential problems for long-term public health solutions. To
properly and practically address this public health emergency, all
causes of misuse and overuse of antibiotics must be addressed.
The discovery of antibiotics fundamentally transformed healthcare
delivery around the world. 9 Today, patient care depends on actors
other than physicians.
Specifically concerning the treatment of
bacterial infections, patient care relies on two essential non-physician
actors: (1) pharmaceutical companies that develop antibiotics; and (2)
the federal government that regulates the drug-market. As the use of
antibiotics has become a cornerstone of our modern medical practice,
the roles and responsibilities of these actors in responding to antibiotic
resistance have become irreversibly intertwined.
Pharmaceutical companies research, develop, and market new
drugs directly to physicians, including antibiotics. These activities are
closely regulated by the Food & Drug Administration (FDA); the
government agency "charged with protecting consumers from unsafe
and fraudulent [drugs]." 1 0 The FDA reviews and approves a drug's

http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf,
at 11 [hereinafter CDC Threat Report].
5. Infectious Disease Soc'y of Am., Combating Antimicrobial Resistance:
Policy Recommendations to Save Lives, 52 (Supp. 5) Clin. Infectious Diseases $397S428, S397 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3738230/.
6. Richard S. Savert, In Tepid Defense of PopulationHealth: Physicians and
Antibiotic Resistance, 34 AM J. L. & MED. 431, 433 (2008).
7. See discussion infra Part I.
8. See discussion infra Part I.A.
9. Facts aboutAntibiotic Resistance, supra note 1.
10. Stephanie M. Greene, After Caronia: FirstAmendment Concerns in OffLabel Promotion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 645, 647 (2014).
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usage, safety, and efficacy information and communicates its findings
to potential consumers through the official drug-label." Additionally,
the official drug-label contains only the specific uses reviewed and
approved by the FDA.12 However, physicians are not strictly bound
by drug labels when prescribing a drug.1 3 Physicians may legally use
their medical judgment to prescribe a drug for off-label uses, or
dosages, because the FDA does not regulate how physicians practice
medicine.1 4 However, off-label prescribing is distinguishable from
off-label promotion by pharmaceutical companies. 1 5
Off-label
16
promotion raises many controversial questions. Aggressive off-label
promotion of antibiotics contributes to the public health problem of
antibiotic resistance, 1 7 and is therefore subject to FDA regulation.
Inappropriate prescription of antibiotics to patients by physicians
drives the development of antibiotic resistance. 1 8 In order for
physicians to make accurate medical judgments about a drug,
physicians must be given complete and unbiased information about
the drug's proper uses. However, physicians are often busy and, so,
rely on pharmaceutical marketers to provide them with information
about a new drug.1 9 Keenly aware of this reliance, pharmaceutical
sales representatives often use off-label promotion to encourage
physicians to prescribe a particular drug more often than may be
necessary.20 This practice is particularly troubling when considered in
the context of promoting new antibiotics to physicians.
Part I of this comment briefly describes what antibiotic resistance
is and how it has become a public health emergency. Part II details
11. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing
Public Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 225, 225 (2011).
12. See discussion infra Part II.A.
13. Greene, supra note 10, at 647.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. ("The FDA discourages off-label promotion because the practice
allows manufactures to evade scientific evaluation of safety and efficacy for these
uses.").

17.
18.
19.
20.

See
See
See
See

discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

I.
I.C.
III.
III.
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the roles of and relationships between pharmaceutical companies, the
FDA, and physicians in the context of antibiotics. Part III outlines the
effect of pharmaceutical promotion, particularly off-label statements,
on physicians' prescribing behaviors. Part IV explains why the
current legislative approach to addressing antibiotic resistance, by
encouraging the development of new antibiotics, is incomplete
without addressing the problems off-label promotion presents.
Finally, Part V describes why the FDA should be allowed to regulate
the off-label promotion of new antibiotics, and how doing so survives
First Amendment scrutiny. Given the unique public health threat
posed by antibiotic resistance, the FDA should regulate aggressive and
inappropriate off-label promotion of new antibiotics to ensure the
progress of new antibiotic development is not undone.
I.

THE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE
FINDS ITS CAUSE IN MISUSE AND OVERUSE OF ANTIBIOTICS

Antibiotic resistance is a predictable phenomenon that has rapidly
become a public health emergency due to, among other factors, the
misuse and overuse of antibiotics. 21
This section provides a
foundational description of: (1) what antibiotics are and how antibiotic
resistance occurs; (2) why antibiotic resistance is a public health
emergency that threatens the practice of modern medicine; and (3)
how misuse and overuse of antibiotics, and a lag in new antibiotic
development, combine to create a perfect storm for the rapid spread of
antibiotic resistance.
A. Antibiotics & Antibiotic Resistance
Since being introduced into mainstream medicine in the 1940s,
antibiotics have become an essential cornerstone of modem

21. See William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial
Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity, 84 TUL. L. REV. 781,
790 (2010). There are several other factors that contribute to antibiotic resistance
not addressed in this comment, such as: (1) containment of resistance organisms to
prevent their proliferation; (2) the use of antibiotics in food production; and (3)
prevention of infection. Id. at 792-94.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014

5

California Western Law Review, Vol. 51 [2014], No. 2, Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5 1

medicine. 22 Antibiotics are essential for a wide variety of medical
procedures including routine surgical procedures to organ transplants
to treatment of cancer and HIV.2 3 However, according to the CDC
"these drugs have been used so widely and for so long that the
[bacteria] the antibiotics are designed to kill have adapted to [the
antibiotics], making the drugs less effective." 24 This phenomenon is
25
known as antibiotic resistance.
"Antibiotic" is a general term that describes a class of drugs,
chemicals, and substances that can kill, or stop the growth of,
bacteria. 26 Antibiotics kill or inhibit the growth of different bacteria
by targeting certain processes within the bacteria that make the
bacteria unable to survive or reproduce. 27 Antibiotics can either be
produced naturally by living organisms or developed in a laboratory
by combining different chemical compounds. 28 Additionally, there
are different classes of antibiotics, distinguishable from each other
based on how they kill or inhibit the growth of bacteria: also known as
an antibiotic's "mode of action. "29 "Narrow-spectrum" antibiotics
22. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, About Antimicrobial Resistance:A
Brief Overview, CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/about.html
(last
updated Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter CDCAbout AntimicrobialResistance].
23. Cesar A. Arias & Barbara E. Murray, Resistant Bugs in the 21st-Century
A Clinical Super-Challenge, 360 NEW. ENG. J. MED 439 (2009), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0804651 (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
24. CDC About AntimicrobialResistance, supra note 22.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Hiroshi Yoneyama & Ryoicihi Katsumata, Antibiotic Resistance in
Bacteria and Its Futurefor Novel Antibiotic Development, 70(5) Biosci., Biotech., &
Biochem. 1060, 1060-75, 1060-61 (2006) (classic targets for antibiotics are: (1) cell
wall biosynthesis (production/creation of something from a living organism)
pathways; (2) protein biosynthesis pathways; (3) DNA and RNA biosynthesis
pathways; and (4) folate (or folic acid) biosynthesis).
28. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Get Smart: Know When
Antibiotics Work, CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc.gov/getsmart/antibiotic-use/antibioticresistance-faqs.html#define-antibiotics (last updated Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter
CDC When Antibiotics Work] (The first antibiotic, penicillin, was discovered using
mold by Alexander Flemming in 1928.).
29. Compound Interest, A Brief Overview of Classes of Antibiotics,
COMPOUNDCHEM.COM,
http://www.compoundchem.conV2014/09/08/antibiotics/
(last visited Dec 28, 2014). For example, penicillin belongs to a class of antibiotics
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describe classes of antibiotics that target specific reactions in certain
species of bacteria; "broad-spectrum" antibiotics describes classes of
antibiotics that effect general features within bacteria and, therefore,
affect a wider range of bacteria. 30 However, "[bjacteria are any of a
very large [and diverse] group of single-celled microorganisms that
display a wide range of metabolic types, geometric shapes and
environmental habitats." 31 Because of this immense diversity, no one
32
antibiotic or class of antibiotics works on all types of bacteria.
Antibiotic resistance "is the result of [bacteria] changing in ways
that reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of [antibiotics] to cure or
prevent infections." 33 Bacteria can develop resistance to a specific
antibiotic or to an entire class of antibiotics. 34 The mere use of
antibiotics can create antibiotic resistance. 35 This is not surprising,
because bacteria's development of antibiotic resistance is a predictable
result of a natural selection 36 occurring at the microbial level. 37 After
many generations, the process of natural selection produces bacteria
called Beta-Lactums, which work by inhibiting the bacteria from making their cell
wall causing them to die. See Compound Interest, Different Classes of Antibiotics:
An
Overview, COUMPOUNDCHEM.COM,
http://www.compoundchem.comlwpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Major-Classes-of-Antibiotics-Summary-v2.png
(last
visited Apr. 27, 2015) (chart depicting different classes of antibiotics, when they
were discovered, examples, and their modes of action).
30. Stephen
Claydon,
Antibiotics,
SCIENCEAID.CO.UK,
http://scienceaid.co.uk/biology/micro/antibiotics.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
31. C.
Michael
Hogan,
Biodiversity:
Bacteria,
EOEARTH.ORG,
http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/150368/ (published Oct. 12, 2014 6:54 PM).
32. See Claydon, supra note 30.
33. Id. (defining "antibiotic" and "antimicrobial agent").
34. Sage & Hyman, supra note 21, at 788.
35. CDC Threat Report, supra note 4, at 14.
36. Natural selection is "[a] process in which some individuals have
genetically-based traits that improve survival or reproduction and thus have more
offspring surviving to reproductive age than other individuals." Understanding
Evolution,
EVOLUTION.BERKELEY.EDU,
http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evosite/
glossary/ glossary browse.shtml (last visited May 5, 2015).
37. THE WORLD HEALTH ORG., AntimicrobialResistance, WHO.INT, available
at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs194/en/ (last updated Apr. 2014)
("The evolution of resistant strains is a natural phenomenon that occurs when
microorganisms replicate themselves erroneously or when resistant traits are
exchanged between them.").
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38
able to survive in an environment despite the presence of antibiotics.
This phenomenon is easily observed in bacteria, because bacteria
reproduce very rapidly producing multiple generations in a single
day. 39 Dramatic environmental changes often accelerate the process
of natural selection. 40 When an environment changes and suddenly
becomes hostile to an organism's survival, one of two things will
happen: the organism will survive or the organism will die. 41 The
more dramatic the change, the stronger the effect of natural selection
42
will be on the organism.

Bacterial cells outnumber human body cells by ten to one and
make up about 1-3% of our total body mass. 4 3 Our bodies are ideal
environments for bacteria, and we depend on many of these organisms
to survive. 4 4 However, sometimes bacteria inside our bodies can
make us sick.4 5 This is when antibiotics enter the picture.46 When an
antibiotic enters the human body, it introduces a compound or

38. Am. Museum of Nat. History, Right Before Our Eyes, AMNH.ORG,
http://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/past-exhibitions/darwin/evolution-today/howlong-does-evolution-take/right-before-our-eyes (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
39. Id.
40. Am. Museum of Nat. History, Extinction or Opportunity?,
http://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/past-exhibitions/darwin/evolution-today/how-donew-species-evolve/extinction-or-opportunity (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (through a
process called punctuated equilibrium).
41. See id.
42. See ALLIANCE FOR THE PRUDENT USE OF ANTIBIOTICS, General
Background
About
Antibiotic
Resistance,
available
at
http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/about-issue/about-antibioticres.shtml
(last visited
Dec.
28,
2014);
see
also,
More
on
Punctuated Equilibrium,
http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evosite/evol01/VIIAlbPunctuated.shtml
(last visited
Apr. 27, 2015) (the effect of natural selection is also referred to as "selection
pressure").
43. NIH Human Microbiome Project Defines Normal Bacterial Make-Up of
the
Body,
NIH.GOv
(June
13,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nih.gov/news/health/jun2012/nhgri-13.htm ("Genes carried by bacteria
in the gastro-intestinal tract, for example, allow humans to digest foods and absorb
nutrients that otherwise would be unavailable.").
44. Id.
45. CDC About Antimicrobial Resistance, supra note 22 (explaining bacteria
and other microbes).
46. CDC When Antibiotics Work, supra note 28.
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chemical hostile to the infectious bacteria's survival. 47
This
drastically changes the body's environment and puts pressure on the
bacteria to resist the effect of the antibiotic. 48 Bacteria that can
survive in an environment containing the antibiotic live; the rest
perish, leaving only the resistant bacteria behind. 49 The probability
that an antibiotic will produce bacteria resistant to it depends on the
strength of the antibiotic's selection pressure. 50
"Whether the
antibiotic will have a strong selection [pressure] ... depends on
several factors, including the amount of the antibiotic used, the
duration of use, the intervals between drug administration, the number
of patients treated with the antibiotic, and the antibiotic's demographic
influence." 51 Ultimately, one of modem medicine's most successful
innovations has a potentially chilling side effect:
[T]here is an antibiotic paradox-prescribing an antibiotic can have
dual, contradictory effects as it combats the targeted bacteria while
also [possibly] increasing selection pressures in the larger
environment for bacterial strains that are resistant to that
antibiotic ....jeopardizing the medication's
effectiveness when
52

used again for future health threats.

B. Antibiotic Resistance Threatens Modern Medicine
Antibiotic resistance is a growing public health concern in the
United States and around the world.5 3 In 2013, the CDC published its
47. Savert, supra note 6, at 440.
48. Id.
49.

ALLIANCE FOR THE PRUDENT USE OF ANTIBIOTICS, supra note

42.

50. "[Selection] Pressure-The influence exerted by some factor (such as an
antibiotic) on natural selection to promote one group of organisms over another. In
the case of antibiotic resistance, antibiotics cause a selective pressure by killing
susceptible bacteria, allowing antibiotic -resistant bacteria to survive and multiply."
ALLIANCE FOR THE PRUDENT USE OF ANTIBIOTICS, Glossary, TUFTS.EDU, available
at http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/about-issue/glossary.shtml#sel (last visited Apr.
27, 2015); see also Savert, supra note 6, at 431, 439-40.
51. Savert, supra note 6, at 440.
52. Id. at 436 (internal quotations omitted).
53. Fed. Food & Drug Admin., CombatingAntibiotic Resistance, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm0928 10.htm#antibiotics
(last updated Oct. 14, 2014).
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first "Threat Report," which provides a "snapshot" of antibiotic
resistance threat in the United States. 54 Alarmingly, the CDC found
bacterial infections, long believed to be vanquished by modern
medicine, are making a rapid comeback.55 Additionally, the CDC
reported that "[e]ach year in the United States, at least 2 million
people acquire serious infection with bacteria that are resistant to one
or more of the antibiotics designed to treat those infections ... [and]
56
at least 23,000 people die as a direct result."
Antibiotic resistance also puts direct and indirect financial strains
on an already overburdened healthcare system. 57 The CDC estimated
that antibiotic resistance costs the U.S. economy $20 billion dollars in
direct excess healthcare costs, and an additional $35 billion dollars in
costs to society, including loss of productivity. 58 These avoidable
excess costs arise from "prolonged and/or costlier treatments,
[extended] hospital stays ... additional doctors visits and health care
use, and result in greater disability and death compared with [nonresistant antibiotic infections]. 59
These trends are increasing at an alarming speed as antibiotic
resistance becomes more prevalent. 60 "Antibiotics are among the
most commonly prescribed drugs used in human medicine," 61 but,
antibiotic resistance threatens our ability to treat common disease and
perform routine medical procedures. 62
54. CDC Threat Report, supra note 4, at 6.
55. For example, tuberculosis, typhoid fever, Group B Strep, gonorrhea, etc.
CDC,
Biggest
Threats,
CDC.GOV,
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/
biggest threats.html (last updated Sept. 16, 2014) (see full list of the eighteen
biggest bacterial threats to the U.S.).
56. CDC Threat Report, supra note 4, at 11.
57. Id.

58. Id. (estimates represent the upper range of the economic cost calculations,
in U.S. dollars).

59. Id.
60. Sage & Hyman, supra note 21, at 788.
61. CDC Threat Report, supra note 4, at 11.
62. Antimicrobial Resistance, supra note 37 ("New resistance mechanisms
emerge and spread globally threatening our ability to treat common infectious
diseases, resulting in death and disability of individuals who until recently could
continue a normal course of life. Without effective anti-infective treatment, many
standard medical treatments will fail or turn into very high risk procedures.").

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol51/iss2/5

10

LaMontagne: Off-Label Promotion, the First Amendment, and Practically Address

2015]

PRACTICALLY ADDRESSING ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE

C. The Three Factors Creatinga Perfect Storm: Misuse, Overuse,
and No New Drug Development
Several factors contribute to the increased speed of antibiotic
resistance. 63 Specifically, the combination of three major factorsmisuse, overuse, and the lack of new antibiotic development-creates
64
a perfect storm for an antibiotic resistance threat.
The "[r]epeated ... improper uses of antibiotics are [the] primary
causes of the increase in [antibiotic]-resistant bacteria." 65 Two forms
of improper use are: misuse and overuse. 6 6 Misuse occurs when
antibiotics are improperly prescribed or are not taken as prescribed.6 v
It "generally arises from faulty individual [physician] decision
making, typically caused by lack of information, cognitive
68
misperceptions of risk and benefits, or some combination thereof",
Physicians most commonly misuse antibiotics by prescribing them
when they are useless. 69 Antibiotics are specifically designed to kill
bacteria but are completely ineffective against viruses.7 0 Thus, when
an antibiotic is prescribed to treat a viral infection-like a cold or the
71
flu-it is useless, unnecessary, and could cause harmful side effects.
According to the CDC Threat Report, "up to 50% of all the antibiotics
63. Sage & Hyman, supra note 21, at 792-95.
64. See generally id.; see also Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,
National Strategy to Combat Antibiotic Resistance, CDC.GOV, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/national-strategy/index.htn-l (last updated Sept.
22, 2014).
65. CDC When Antibiotics Work, supra note 28.
66. Sage & Hyman, supra note 21, at 790. This comment does not directly
address the other issues such as containment, prevention, and use in food and
agriculture.
67. Combating Antibiotic Resistance, supra note 53.
68. Sage & Hyman, supra note 21, at 791.

69. Id.
70. Combating Antibiotic Resistance, supra note 53.
71. Id. at 2 (Using an antibiotic to treat a viral infection: "(1) will not cure the

infection; (2) will not keep other individuals from catching the virus; (3) will not
help a person feel better; (4) may cause unnecessary, harmful side effects; and (5)
may contribute to the development of antibiotic resistance.").
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prescribed... are not needed or are not optimally effective as
prescribed."
Overuse occurs when "big-gun," or broad-spectrum, antibiotics
are used to treat infections that could be treated with weaker, narrowspectrum, antibiotics. 72 The overuse of broad-spectrum antibiotics
creates a strong selection pressure for resistant organisms to develop
quickly. 73 Still further, overuse creates a risk to current and future
patients with rare and often life-threatening infections.7 4
The third factor that contributes to this public health emergency is
the considerable slowdown of new antibiotic development.7 5
According to the CDC, the FDA approved just eight new antibiotics
between 2000 and 2010.76 Additionally, no new classes of antibiotics
have been developed in the past two decades.7 7 This unfortunate trend
is unsurprising, because antibiotic discovery and development have
become more scientifically complex, expensive, and time-consuming
as medicine has progressed. 7 8
Combined, these three factors have created a global public health
emergency. 79 According to the Infectious Disease Society of America
"[we have] reached a critical point in treating infectious diseases: new
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. CDC Threat Report, supra note 4, at 44.
76. Id. at 45-46.
77. Id.
78. Brad Spellberg, New Antibiotic Development: Barriers& Opportunitiesin
2012, APUA NEWSLETTER, Vol. 30 No. 1 (Alliance for the Prudent Use of
Antibiotics
(APUA)
Clinical
Newsletter),
available
at
http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/news/news-newsletter-vol-30-no- 1-2. shtml
(last
visited Nov. 9 2014).
79. The World Health Organization (WHO) recognizes that antibiotic
resistance "is an increasingly serious threat to global public health that requires
action across all government sectors and society ....
[According to] WHO's 2014
report on global surveillance of antimicrobial resistance reveals that antibiotic
resistance is no longer a prediction for the future; it is happening right now, across
the world, and is putting at risk the ability to treat common infections in the
community and hospitals. Without urgent, coordinated action, the world is heading
towards a post-antibiotic era, in which common infections and minor injuries, which
have been treatable for decades, can once again kill." Antimicrobial Resistance,
supra note 37.
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[antibiotics] are not being developed at anywhere near the pace
necessary to keep ahead of the natural ability of bacteria to evolve and
defend themselves against antibiotics." 80 This means "some of our
most powerful and medically essential drugs, antibiotics, are
81
becoming useless."

II.

PHYSICIANS, PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES, AND THE

FDA ALL

PLAY KEY AND INTERRELATED ROLES IN THE REALM OF ANTIBIOTICS

Three crucial actors play integrated and essential roles in
addressing the problem of antibiotic resistance: (1) pharmaceutical
companies; (2) the FDA; and (3) physicians. A comprehensive and
effective long-term response to antibiotic resistance requires an
understanding of how these actors interact and influence one
another. 82
A. PharmaceuticalCompanies: Researching, Developing,
Manufacturing, and Marketing New Antibiotics
The role of pharmaceutical companies is to research, develop,
manufacture, and market antibiotics. 83 Notwithstanding the slight
decline in market growth because of generic drugs, 84 the U.S.
pharmaceutical market is "still the largest single pharmaceutical
market [worldwide], generating [nearly] 329 billion U.S. dollars [in

80. Facts about Antibiotic Resistance, supra note 1.
81. Id.
82. Other important actors who are not addressed in this comment are: (1)
monitoring and data collection agencies like the CDC or state health departments;
(2) patients; and (3) educational institutions and groups for both physicians and the
general public. See Sage & Hyman, supra note 21, at 785-87.
83. Int'l Trade Admin., Pharmaceutical Industry Profile, TRADE.GOV,
available
at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/health/Pharmaceutical
IndustryProfile2010.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (The U.S. Census Bureau
defines pharmaceutical companies as "companies engaged in researching,
developing, manufacturing, and marking drugs ... for [medical] use.").
84. Id. at 4.
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2013] of revenue." 8 5 However, despite pharmaceutical companies'
impressive size and market presence, they have been reluctant to
participate in the development of new antibiotics. 86 This reluctance is
unfortunate yet unsurprising, because antibiotic discovery and
development has become: (1) more scientifically complex; (2) costly;
and (3) time-consuming as medicine has progressed.8 7
First, the difficulty and expense of discovering new and novel
antibiotics has substantially increased because the "low-hanging fruit
[in antibiotic discovery] has already been picked., 88 Generally,
antibiotics inhibit specific "targets" within a type, or types, of bacteria
that either kill or inhibit the growth of those bacteria. 89 "According to
Dr. Yoneyama and Dr. Katsumata, although a large number of
antibiotics are used clinically, the variety of targets they inhibit is
limited." 90 The main strategy of the pharmaceutical industry in
developing antibiotics has been to modify existing antibiotics. 91 Over
time, this approach has produced less successful results, because
modified antibiotics do not meet society's demands for new
antibiotics. However, compared to the average forty years required to
develop a new structural class of antibiotics, modifying existing drugs
is much easier than trying to discover a new target. 92 According to the
Alliance for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics, each new generation of
antibiotics raises the bar, and the cost, in terms of the resources
93
necessary to discover and develop successive generations.

85. Global PharmaceuticalSalesfrom 2011 to 2013, by region (in billion U.S.
dollars),
STATISTA.COM,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/272181/worldpharmaceutical-sales-by-region/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
86. Spellberg, supra note 78.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Yoneyama & Katsumata, supra note 27, at 1060-75.
90. Id. at 1061 ("The main classes of antibiotics inhibit four classical targets
(Fig. 1): (i) cell wall biosynthesis; (ii) protein biosynthesis; (iii) DNA and RNA
biosynthesis; and (iv) folate biosynthesis.").
91. Id. at 1067-68.
92. Id.
93. Spellberg, supra note 78.
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Second, pharmaceutical companies face lengthy and expensive
regulatory challenges. 94 The general drug approval process can be
broken down into four general stages: (1) preclinical; (2) clinical; (3)
NDA Approval; and (4) post-marketing. 95 Over a ten-year period, it
took seventy-two candidate antibiotics to yield one FDA-approved
product, whereas other pharmaceuticals required an average of only
fifteen candidates to yield an FDA-approved product. 96 In 2013, for
all drug development, pharmaceutical companies spent about $51.5
97
billion dollars on research and development costs alone.
Additionally, the average cost of the entire approval process for a new
drug can exceed eighty million dollars.9 8 In fact, according to the
Alliance for the Prudent use of Antibiotics, "[s]everal companies have
publicly stated ... that given how difficult it is to get antibiotics
approved by the FDA, they are considering simply abandoning the
99
U.S. antibiotic market."
Pharmaceutical companies may be willing to deal with the
scientific and regulatory challenges if antibiotics were "blockbuster

94. Id.
95. After a drug is developed and tested on animals during the pre-clinical
stage, the pharmaceutical company submits an application to the FDA for approval.
See
Food
&
Drug
Admin.,
Drug Approval
Process, FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/UCM284393 .p
df (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (graphical representation of the basic drug approval
process). The FDA reviews this application to determine if the drug and proposed
trials are appropriate for human testing. Id. Once the FDA approves the
application, the clinical stage begins, which consists of three phases of human
testing. Id. After a drug reaches phase two of that process, the FDA meets to
determine if the drug should continue to phase 3 testing, and after the clinical stage
is complete the FDA reviews the information on the drug label, the manufacturing
facility, and the marketing material. Id. After the FDA approves all of the, the drug
is officially approved for the market place. Id.
96. Caitlin Forsyth, Comment, Repairing the Antibiotic Pipeline: Can the
GAIN Act do it?, 9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 1, 5 (2013).
97. Biopharmaceutical
Research
Indus.,
2014 Profile,
PHRMA.ORG,
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014_PhRMAPROFILE.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 27, 2015) ("Key Facts").
98. Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, The Drug Approval and
Development
Process,
THE
INDEPENDENT
INSTITUTE,
http://www.fdareview.org/approval-process.shtml (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
99. Spellberg, supra note 78.
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drugs" that would allow companies to make a return on significant
investments.100 Unfortunately, most companies do not see such
returns; by the time the FDA approves a candidate antibiotic and puts
it on the market, a 20-year patent term is likely nearing its end.101
These low reimbursement rates combined with increasing competition
with generic drugs drive down the price of new antibiotics. This
results in companies having trouble making profits.10 2 For example,
the current models of reimbursement for antibiotics, such as bundled
rates used in hospitals, provide strong incentives for hospitals and
physicians to prescribe low-cost generic antibiotics.10 3 Ultimately, it
is challenges like these that make4 pharmaceutical companies less
10
willing to develop new antibiotics.
B. The FDA: Ensuring Safety and Efficacy of Drugs
Before They Enter the Market

The fundamental function of the FDA is to protect consumers
from unsafe, ineffective, or fraudulent food and drugs.10 5 This is
achieved by requiring that all new drugs be tested, reviewed, and
approved for safety, efficacy, and effectiveness before reaching the
market.1 0 6 Rather than give a new drug a general blanket approval,
the FDA approves drugs for specific uses10 7 that must be requested by
100. Id.; see also Kevin Outterson, New Business Models for Sustainable
Antibiotics, 15-16 (Centre on Global Health Security Working Grp., Papers, Paper
No.
1,
2014),
available
at
http://www.Chathamhouse.org/sites/files/
chathamhouse/public/Research/Global%20Health/0214SustainableAntibiotics.pdf.
101. Outterson, supra note 100, at 7.
102. Id. at 15-16.
103. Id.
104. Spellberg, supra note 78; see also Outterson, supra note 100, at 15-16.
105. Greene, supra note 10, at 646.
106. Kesselheim, supra note 11, at 225.
107. "[V]aldecoxib (Bextra), a cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitor type of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug that, in 2001, was submitted to the FDA for

approval as a treatment for pain associated with osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis,
menstrual cycle pain, and acute pain. The FDA approved the drug for only the first

three indications, rejecting acute pain as an indication because of specific dangers
identified in pre-marketing trials." Id. (example of specific use approval done by the
FDA).
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the manufacturer.10 8
After an extensive review of the drug's
information submitted by the manufactures, the FDA summarizes its
approved findings in the official drug-label.1 0 9 The label contains: (1)
a summary of basic information about the drug; (2) the results from
pre-FDA-approval studies; (3) the dosage information; (4) safety
information and warnings; and (5) the effectiveness of the drug per its
11 0
FDA-approved uses.
The FDA's regulatory authority does not end after it approves a
new drug and pens the official drug-label; the FDA also regulates how
drugs are marketed to consumers. 1 Pharmaceutical companies must
submit their promotional materials to the FDA for review to ensure
112
the materials "accurately summarize the drug's [uses] and risks."
This process is vital because The Food Drug and Cosmetics Act
("FDCA") restricts misleading and unsubstantiated promotional
claims.1 1 3 The FDCA and the FDA require pre-market approval
primarily because "post-market actions against misleading claims are
incapable of protecting consumers from unsafe and ineffective
1 14
products."
The FDA classifies uses and promotional statements similar to, or
the same as, the FDA's approved label as "on-label." ' 1 5 Any uses or
promotional statements outside the four corners of the label are
considered "off-label." 1 1 6 While neither the FDA nor the FDCA
expressly prohibit off-label promotion, courts have interpreted
statutory language to punish pharmaceutical sales representatives for
"misbranding" by giving information about an off-label use to a

108. Id.
109. Id. at 232.
110. Id.
111. Greene, supra note 10, at 647 n1.
112. Kesselheim, supra note 11, at 239.
113. Henry A. Waxman, A History of Adverse Drug Experiences: Congress
Had Ample Evidence to Support Restrictions on the Promotion of Prescription
Drugs, 58 FOOD DRUG L.J. 299, 300-01 (2003); see also 21 C.F.R §201.5 (Deering
2014).
114. Waxman, supra note 113, at 299.
115. Kesselheim, supra note 11, at 255.
116. Id.
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117
physician with the intent that the drug be prescribed in such a way.
Similarly, from the FDA's perspective, advertising a drug for a use
other than the drug's "intended use"1 18 is evidence of objective intent
to introduce that drug into the stream of commerce for an unapproved
use; therefore, such conduct potentially qualifies as "misbranding"
under the FDCA.1 1 9

C. Physicians are the Gatekeepers of Antibiotics
1 20
Physicians perform a critical role as gatekeepers for antibiotics.
Patients can only receive an antibiotic through a physician's
prescription; therefore, physicians have substantial control over the
volume of antibiotics being used in humans. 121 In fact, physicians are
the primary consumers of antibiotics designed to treat human
pathogens, and pharmaceutical companies spend large sums on
marketing directly to them.1 22 This is potentially concerning when
considering new antibiotics because physicians often rely on
promotional statements as a primary source of information about a
new drug. 12 3 According to the CDC, lack of information causes up to
half of the prescriptions for antibiotics in the United States being
prescribed inappropriately. 124 In fact, the information that physicians
receive from pharmaceutical sales-representatives is often geared
more towards selling a drug to a physician rather than presenting

117. Greene, supra note 10, at 658-59.
118. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (Deering 2015) ("intended uses" refers to the
"objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of drugs" and
objective intent may be shown "by labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or
written statements by such persons or their representatives").
119. See Greene, supra note 10, at 659 ("Because labeling requirements are
construed in a very broad manner, including oral representations made by
pharmaceutical representatives, a representative who gives information about offlabel use to a doctor with the intent that the drug be distributed in commerce is
misbranding the drug.").
120. Savert, supra note 6, at 446-47.
121. Id. at 434-35.
122. See discussion infra Part III.
123. See discussion infra Part III.
124. CDC Threat Report, supra note 4, at 11.
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objective information about the drug's uses. 125 Therefore, this could
lead to physicians having incomplete information about a new
antibiotic and inappropriately prescribe that antibiotic more often as a
result.1 26 Because misuse and overuse are two key driving factors for
antibiotic resistance, it is essential that physicians receive accurate and
127
unbiased information so they can prescribe antibiotics prudently.
Pharmaceutical marketing statements must be addressed to
prevent the improper prescription of new antibiotics because these
statements have a strong effect on physicians' prescribing
128
behaviors.

III.

THE EFFECT OF MARKETING ON PHYSICIANS' PRESCRIBING
BEHAVIORS AND ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE

Studies show that pharmaceutical marketing has a statistically
significant influence on physicians' prescribing choices and habits. 129
Thus, direct-to-physician off-label marketing could potentially
perpetuate misuse and overuse of new antibiotics.
Marketing is vital for pharmaceutical companies and represents a
large portion of their expenditures.1 30
In 2012, pharmaceutical
1 31
marketing expenditures exceeded approximately $27 billion dollars.

125. Greene, supra note 10, at 702-03.
126. See discussion infra Part III.
127. Savert, supra note 6, at 436.
128. See discussion infra Part III.A.
129. Katherine T. Vukadin, Failure-to-Warn:Facing Up to the Real Impact of
PharmaceuticalMarketing on the Physician's Decision to Prescribe, 50 TULSA L.
REv. 75, 82 (2014) (citing Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and
Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An
Integrative Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 785, 809 (2005)).
130. Id. at 79.
131. The Pew Charitable Trust, Persuading the Prescribers:Pharmaceutical
Industry Marketing and its Influence on Physicians and Patients, PEwTRUSTS.ORG
(published Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/factsheets/2013/1 1/ 11/persuading -the-prescribers-pharmaceutic al-industry-marketingand-its-influence-on-physicians-and-patients
[hereinafter
Persuading
the
Prescribers] (citing Cegedim Strategic Data, 2012 U.S. Pharmaceutical Company
Promotion
Spending
(2013),
SKAINFO.COM,
http://www.skainfo.com/
health care market reports/2012_promotional-spending.pdf).
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"Some estimate that pharmaceutical companies spend about two times
as much money on marketing than they do on research and
development." 132
Further, the pharmaceutical industry employs
several marketing strategies designed to promote drug companies'
products by influencing doctors' prescribing practices.1 33 Several of
these strategies involve building a relationship with the physician with
the express objective to influence the physician's prescribing
behavior. These strategies include: (1) free samples; (2) promotional
mailings; (3) gifts; (4) face-to-face meetings with physicians; and (5)
journal and web advertisements. 1 34 The pharmaceutical industry's
most successful marketing strategy is "detailing." Detailing is where
sales representatives meet with and market drugs and devices directly
to physicians.1 35 Each year, detailers, who are trained to influence the
prescribing behavior of physicians, make about 115 million
136
promotional visits to physicians' offices.
Generally, physicians report they are not influenced by
pharmaceutical sales representatives. 1 37
Indeed, "[p]hysicians
themselves tend to report that contacts with pharmaceutical
representatives have little to no effect on their prescribing behavior,
although some believe that their colleagues' judgment may be
affected." 1 38 However, "[e]mpirical evidence indicates that despite
physicians' beliefs to the contrary, pharmaceutical marketing is
effective in influencing physicians' actions, whether those actions
result in requesting additions to a formulary, initiating use of a certain

132. Persuading the Prescribers, supra note 131 ("[A]pproximately 24.4.
percent of each revenue dollar is spend on marketing as opposed to 13.4 percent on
research and development.") (citing Donald W. Light & Joel R. Lexchin,
Pharmaceuticalresearch and development: what do we get for all that money?,
BMJ.COM (published Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.bmj.com/content/345/bmj.e4348).
133. Persuading the Prescribers, supra note 131; see also Vukadin, supra
note 129, at 80.
134. Persuadingthe Prescribers,supra note 131
135. Vukadin, supra note 129, at 80 ("The pharmaceutical industry considers
detailing ... to be the most effective form of pharmaceutical marketing.").
136. Id. ("Pharmaceutical sales representatives pay about 115 million visits to
340,000 [physicians] each year.").
137. Id. at 80-81.
138. Id.
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drug, or choosing to prescribe one drug over another."1 3 9 In fact, one
meta-analysis indicated a positive association with the number of
1 40
marketing visits and the frequency the marketed drug is prescribed.
However, "[s]tudies do not show that an increase in pharmaceutical
representative visits correspond with any increase at all in prescribing

quality." 141
Courts often assume that physicians can distinguish between a
sales pitch and a presentation of reliable scientific data, but that
assumption is not always accurate.1 4 2 Although physicians are highly
educated, it is difficult to verify off-label statements made by drug
detailers, because such information is not publicly available for new
drugs.1 4 3 Additionally, busy physicians often do not have extra time
to assess new drugs, or antibiotics, independently. 144 Thus, physicians
rely on detailers' statements. 145
Because "[t]he prevailing business model is to recoup
pharmaceutical [research and development] investments through sales
revenues above marginal cost during a period of patent-based
exclusivity," pharmaceutical sales representatives aggressively market
new drugs for both on and off-label to physicians during their
detailing sessions.1 46 "The FDA discourages off-label promotion of
drugs because the practice allows [pharmaceutical companies] to
evade scientific evaluation of safety and efficacy." 1 4 7 Despite the
FDA's concerns, off-label marketing is not only common, but is seen
139. Id. at 81.
140. Id. at 82.
141. Id. at 84.
142. Greene, supra note 10, at 694. For drugs that have been around for years,
physicians do have access to the "Orange Book" published by the FDA. Physicians
consult this book to sift through the approved uses and non-approved uses for
drugs-thus they can distinguish between off and on-label usage marketing
schemes. See Fed. Food & Drug Admin., Orange Book, FDA.GOV, available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm (last visited Apr. 27,
2015). However, this book does not always provide timely information for brand
new drugs. See id.
143. Greene, supra note 10, at 694.
144. Id. at 702.
145. Id.
146. Outterson, supra note 100, at 15-16.
147. Greene, supra note 10, at 647.
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as a non-issue by many drug and device manufacturers.1 48 This is
particularly concerning when considered in the context of antibiotic
resistance, because two major driving forces behind this phenomenon
are misuse and overuse. 149

Off-label promotion of antibiotics

encourages physicians to use new antibiotics in ways or for conditions
not independently approved by the FDA.1 50

In fact, despite the

general denial of the effect of marketers on their prescribing behavior,
studies of physicians' knowledge of drug properties show that their
knowledge is more in line with sales information than the medical
1 51
literature.
In short, pharmaceutical detailers use the trust physicians place in
their statements to increase the number of prescriptions of a new drug.
In the context of antibiotics, a large quantity of low quality
52
1
prescriptions is disastrous and only perpetuates misuse.

IV. CURRENT FEDERAL ACTION BEING TAKEN TO COMBAT ANTIBIOTIC
RESISTANCE IS INCOMPLETE WITHOUT ADDRESSING OFF-LABEL
PROMOTION OF NEW ANTIBIOTICS

A. Recent LegislationAimed at IncreasingSupply is Incomplete
Recently, the federal government has taken action to address the
public health emergency posed by antibiotic resistance. In 2011,
Congress first formally addressed the issue by passing the Generating
Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act.1 53 The GAIN Act focuses
148. Id. at 648 ("Off-Label marketing has been described as 'so common
among drug and device makers that it's often dismissed as the equivalent of driving
slightly over the speed limit."').
149. Sage & Hyman, supra note 21, at 791.
150. In 2005, the FDA reprimanded pharmaceutical company Pfizer for
aggressively promoting a powerful new antibiotic call linezolid. The antibiotic was
part of a new class and was being promoted by Pfizer as a treatment for all types of
MSRA infections, even though the FDA had only approved linezolid for only
limited MRSA indications. See Savert, supra note 6, at 433 n. 11 (citing Letter from
Thomas W. Abrams R.Ph., Officer, Pfizer, Inc. (July 20, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/2005/Zyvox-wl.pdf).
151. Kesselheim, supra note 11, at 248.
152. See CDC Threat Report, supra note 4.
153. Forsyth, supra note 96, at 3.
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54

almost exclusively on incentivizing production of new antibiotics.
"The GAIN Act provides pharmaceutical companies [several]
incentives to develop new antibiotics to combat the growing problem
of antibiotic resistance." 1 55 For example, GAIN "[a]dds five years of
exclusivity to qualified new antibiotics" and an "additional six months
1 56
for antibiotics that are paired with a companion diagnostic test."
Additionally, GAIN provides priority and fast-track review of new
1 57
antibiotics by the FDA.
B. Regulating the Off-Label Promotionof New Antibiotics is a
PracticalNecessity
While legislation like GAIN is essential to address the lack of new
antibiotic development, the Act is not a complete fix.1 58 GAIN
focuses on the supply/production side of the issue, with little to no
focus on regulating the way these new antibiotics would be used or
marketed.1 59 Thus, the potential for off-label promotion of these new

154. Forsyth, supra note 96, at 9.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 7; see 21 U.S.C. § 335(f) (2102) (exclusivity provision), 21 U.S.C.
§ 360(n) (2012) (fast-track and priority review provision). There are several
distinctions between the Fast Track designation and the normal New Drug Approval
(NDA process). "A drug that receives Fast Track designation is eligible for some or
all of the following: (1) More frequent meetings with FDA to discuss the drug's
development plan and ensure collection of appropriate data needed to support drug
approval; (2) more frequent written communication from FDA about such things as
the design of the proposed clinical trials and use of biomarkers; (3) eligibility for
Accelerated Approval and PriorityReview, if relevant criteria are met; (4) Rolling
Review, which means that a drug company can submit completed sections of its
Biologic License Application (BLA) or New Drug Application (NDA) for review by
FDA, rather than waiting until every section of the NDA is completed before the
entire application can be reviewed. BLA or NDA review usually does not begin until
the drug company has submitted the entire application to the FDA." Fed. Food &
Drug Admin., Fast Track, FDA.GOV
(last updated Sept.
15, 2014)
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Fast/ucm405399.htm.
158. See Forsyth, supra note 96, at 10-14.
159. Forsyth, supra note 96 at 9 ("[T]here are no provision encouraging
appropriate use and marketing of new antibiotics to prevent antibiotic resistance to
these new antibiotics.").
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drugs for unapproved uses threatens to undermine any progress GAIN
generates.
Incentivizing the production of new antibiotics and educating
physicians and the general public about antibiotic resistance are
essential to combating antibiotic resistance; however, this approach is
incomplete without addressing how new antibiotics will be marketed.
As discussed supra, misuse and overuse of antibiotics are two
primary factors that contribute to the rapid growth of antibiotic
resistance.1 60
Physicians' inaccurate or incomplete knowledge
regarding an antibiotic or class of antibiotics often leads to misuse and
overuse.1 61 In most instances, the majority of the information about a
new antibiotic comes from pharmaceutical marketing and sales
representatives.1 62 Unfortunately, these pharmaceutical companies
face "an inherent conflict of interest between the legitimate business
goals ... and the social, medical and economic needs ... to select and

use [antibiotics] in the most rational way." 1 63 Thus, regulating how
pharmaceutical sales representatives market to physicians may aid
problems regarding inappropriate prescription of antibiotics. Off-label
promotion is a common practice, especially during detailing
sessions.1 64 Empirical evidence shows that marketing practices
influence physicians' prescription behavior and can increase the
1 65
quantity-but not necessarily the quality-of that behavior.
Without preventing pharmaceutical makers, who have substantial
financial incentives to increase the quantity of new antibiotics sold,
from making unapproved and non-independently-verified claims
about drug uses, any progress against the threat of antibiotic resistance
may be lost.
The FDA may regulate pharmaceutical marketing under the
misbranding provision of the FDCA.1 66 But, recent judicial decisions
160. Sage & Hyman, supra note 21, at 791.
161. CDC Threat Report, supra note 4, at 11.
162. World
Health
Org.,
Pharmaceutical Industry,
WHO.INT,
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2015).

163. Id.
164.
165.
166.
21 C.F.R.

Greene, supra note 10, at 649.
See discussion supra Part III.
Greene, supra note 10, at 660; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(k), (m) (2012);
§ 202.1 (Deering 2014).
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do not clearly state whether the FDA can constitutionally regulate offlabel promotional statements that sales representatives make during
detailing.1 67 However, given the unique public health threat posed by
antibiotic resistance, the FDA should have the ability to regulate offlabel promotional statements made during the sale of new antibiotics.
Such discretion will help ensure that aggressive and medically
reckless marketing does not burden regulations that promote the
development of new antibiotics.
V. How FDA RESTRICTIONS ON ANTIBIOTIC MARKETING CONTEND
WITH COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH

Courts should allow the FDA to regulate the off-label promotion
of new antibiotics because of antibiotic resistance. The FDA appears
to have the power to restrict off-label promotion of new antibiotics to
promote public health. In fact, the FDA already regulates
pharmaceutical marketing through its labeling provisions, including
oral statements made by pharmaceutical representatives for
promotional purposes.1 6 8 However, pharmaceutical companies have
objected to those types of regulations claiming the regulations violate
their commercial free speech rights.1 6 9 Recently some courts have
1 70
agreed with that objection.
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,1 71 the United States Supreme Court
recognized that pharmaceutical marketing is protected speech under
the First Amendment.1 72 Therefore, content-based, or speaker-based,
regulations on such speech are subject to "heightened judicial
scrutiny." 1 73 Relying on Sorrell, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
1 74
in United States v. Caronia,
held the FDCA misbranding provision
166.
167.
168.
21 C.F.R.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part V.
Greene, supra note 10, at 660; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(k), (m) (2012);
§ 202.1.
Greene, supra note 10, at 654.
See generally Greene, supra note 10.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011).
Id. at 2659.
Id.
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2013).
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did not apply to off-label statements made by sales representatives
during detailing sessions. 175 While the overall debate about the
general restriction, or ban, of off-label promotion has not been settled,
the FDA should have the power to restrict off-label promotion of new
antibiotics. These restrictions would survive the Sorrell and Caronia
strict scrutiny test.
A. RegulationsMust Survive Strict Scrutiny Under Sorrell
FDA regulations on pharmaceutical marketing have recently come
under strict constitutional scrutiny. Two recent cases highlight the
constitutional hurdles that any FDA regulation regarding promotional
statements may face.
First, in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,176 the Supreme Court analyzed
a Vermont law that banned the sale of "physician prescribing
information" to pharmaceutical companies for marketing purposes. 177
Prior to the law's enactment, pharmacies collected data on individual
physicians based on what drugs physicians prescribed and how often
the physicians prescribed specific drugs. 17 8 Pharmacies then sold that
information to "data miners"1 7 9 who processed the information into
reports and leased those reports to pharmaceutical companies.1 80 That
process enabled the pharmaceutical companies to tailor their
1 81
marketing strategies based on physicians' prescribing habits.
Opponents argued that the law unconstitutionally limited commercial
1 82
speech of pharmaceutical sales representatives.

175. Id. at 165; see also Greene, supra note 10, at 645, 678.
176. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653.
177. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct at 2659. ("Physician prescribing information" is
information about the prescription habits of individual physicians collected by
pharmacies.").
178. Id.
179. "'[D]ata miners,' [are] firms that analyze prescriber-identifying
information and produce reports on prescriber behavior." Id. at 2660.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 2660-61.
182. Id. at 2661.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol51/iss2/5

26

LaMontagne: Off-Label Promotion, the First Amendment, and Practically Address

2015]

PRACTICALLY ADDRESSING ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE

319

The Court first recognized that pharmaceutical marketing is
considered protected speech under the First Amendment. 8 3 Next, the
Court concluded that banning the sale of that information to
1 84
pharmaceutical companies for sales purposes was discriminatory.
The Court observed that pharmacies were allowed to sell, or share,
physicians' prescription information to others, including research
institutions or universities. 185 Therefore, the majority reasoned that
the Vermont law disfavored "speech with a particular content
[marketing] ...
[and] specific speakers" namely pharmaceutical
manufacturers.1 86 The Court further held that a law placing "contentbased" or "speaker-based" restrictions on speech will be presumed
invalid and subject to strict scrutiny.1 87 In order to overcome that
presumption, the State must show "that the [regulation] directly
advances a substantial governmental interest and that the measure is
1 88
drawn to achieve that interest."
Second, in United States v. Caronia, the majority of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals used the analysis from Sorrell to conclude
that the FDCA's provisions against misbranding could not be applied
to sales representatives' off-label promotional statements. 1 89 There,
the federal government investigated a pharmaceutical sales
representative for violating the FDCA's provisions against
misbranding.1 90
During trial, the Government cited off-label
promotional statements-directly contradicting the FDA's black box
label for the product1 91 -made by the defendant during his detailing
trips to physicians' offices. 192 The Government argued that these
183. Id. at 2659.
184. Id. at 2656-57.
185. Id. at 2661, 2663 ("[P]harmacies may sell the information to private of
academic researchers but not, for example, to pharmaceutical marketers.").
186. Id. at 2656-57.
187. Id. at 2667.
188. Id.
189. See generally United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166-69 (2d Cir.
2013); see also Greene, supra note 10, at 674-80.
190. Caronia,703 F.3d at 160-61.
191. Id. at 156-57.
192. Id. at 160-61 (The court did not address the accuracy of the promotional
information and assumed it to be truthful. Caronia asserted the information was
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statements, made during detailing sessions, were evidence of the
defendant's intent to introduce a drug into the stream of commerce for
1 93
an unapproved use violating the FDCA's misbranding provisions.
In response, the defendant argued that the provisions violated his First
Amendment rights under Sorrell, because they imposed both
"speaker-based" and "content-based" restrictions on protected

speech. 194
Relying on Sorrell, the majority agreed that the defendant's
speech was protected.1 95 Caronia held the FDCA's misbranding
provisions, as-applied, failed to satisfy the test mandated by Sorrell
because the provisions: (1) did not advance a substantial government
interest; and (2) were not narrowly drawn.1 96 The court reasoned that
the provisions did not directly advance a government interest, because
off-label prescription is lawful, and physicians can acquire
information about off-label uses from sources other than sales
representatives.1 97 Additionally, the court suggested the FDCA's
misbranding provisions, as applied to off-label promotion, were not
narrowly drawn, because other methods were available that could
198
achieve the same governmental interests.
Any FDA regulation seeking to restrict promotional speech must,
therefore, survive the strict scrutiny of Sorrell. The following
subsections address each element of the First Amendment analysis as
applied to FDA regulations of the off-label promotion of new
antibiotics, and distinguish this type of off-label promotion from that
discussed in Caronia.

truthful and the FDA did not challenge this assertion. Therefore, the court did not
deal with the accuracy of the claims.).

193. Id. at 160.
194. Id. at 164, 166.

195. Id. at 162.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 168 (Although the court lists several alternative options, the
court did not address the validity of these potential "other methods.").
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1. Responding to Antibiotic Resistance is a
SubstantialGovernment Interest
Allowing the FDA to regulate the off-label promotion of new
antibiotics promotes a substantial government interest.
Courts
recognize that the government has a substantial interest in protecting
the health and safety of American citizens.1 99 Antibiotic resistance
threatens both the health and safety of American citizens on a global
20 0
scale.
Additionally, courts have recognized that the government has a
separate, but closely related, substantial interest in preserving the
integrity and effectiveness of the FDA's premarket drug-approval
processes.2 0 1 Prior to 1962, the FDCA did not require drugs to be
tested for effectiveness before being marketed. 0z
However, after a
decade of congressional hearings on the matter, Congress recognized
that this system endangered the health of American citizens.20 3 The
hearings revealed that physicians relied on misleading promotional
material and with "no reliable source of evidence from which
physicians could tell effective drugs from ineffective drugs," many
Americans "were being subjected unnecessarily to toxic drugs whose
benefits had been greatly exaggerated or were nonexistent."2 0 4 Thus,
in 1962 congress passed the 1962 Drug Amendments to the FDCA.
The Amendments emphasized the importance of premarket review by
an objective body.20 5 Off-label promotion undermines this process by
promoting drugs that have not been independently reviewed by the
FDA. 2 06
Still further, courts have recognized that the "purpose of the
commercial speech doctrine is to protect consumers from misleading,

199. Greene, supra note 10, at 675.
200. See discussion supra Part I.
201. See Greene, supra note 11, at 681-82; Waxman, supra note 113, at 309.
202. Waxman, supra note 113, at 300-01.
203. See generally Waxman, supra note 113.
204. Id. at 301-02.
205. Id. at 307.
206. Greene, supra note 10, at 658.
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deceptive or aggressive sales practices." 20 7 Congress passed the
FDCA because it recognized that pharmaceutical companies and their
representatives "face perverse financial incentives that encourage the
inappropriate use of [antibiotics] .... 208 This is particularly relevant
in the context of new antibiotics and antibiotic resistance. The fact
that pharmaceutical companies profit from increasing the number of
antibiotics prescriptions, encourages aggressive marketing. 20 9 This is
particularly true at the beginning of a new antibiotic's market life
when the patent period is still valid. 210 Therefore, courts have
recognized a substantial government interest in subjecting new drugs
to the FDA's pre-market approval process. 211 Accordingly, restricting
the off-label promotion of new antibiotics promotes the government's
substantial interest in practically addressing antibiotic resistance.
2. Restricting Off-Label Promotion of Antibioticsfor Use in
Medicine Directly Advances the Government's Interest
Finally, recent federal action is evidence that controlling the
21 2
spread of antibiotic resistance is a substantial government interest.
In addition to the GAIN Act, in September of 2014, President Obama
enacted an Executive Order providing a federally coordinated
approach to combat antibiotic resistance. 21 3 The Order called for the
FDA and pharmaceutical companies to collaborate in disseminating
information to physicians regarding appropriate new uses of
antibiotics. 21 4 Allowing the FDA to regulate off-label promotion of
207. Id. at 646 (quoting Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51,
64-65 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
208. Outterson, supra note 100, at 17. This inappropriate use includes misuse

and overuse.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211.

Waxman, supra note 113, at 309.

212. See discussion supra Part III.
213. See Exec. Order No. 13,676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56931 (Sept. 18, 2014),
https://federalregister.gov/a/2014-22805; see also National Strategy for Combating
Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, WHITEHOSE.GOV (published Sept. 2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/carb-national-strategy.pdf.
214. See Exec. Order No. 13,676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56931 (Sept. 18, 2014),
https://federalregister.gov/a/2014-22805.
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new antibiotics directly advances the government's interest in slowing
antibiotic resistance. Because off-label marketing of new antibiotics
can have a substantial and direct effect on physician prescription
behaviors and could lead to the misuse and overuse of new antibiotics
the FDA should have the power to regulate such off-label
21 5
promotion.
Allowing off-label promotion of new antibiotics not only poses a
risk to public health, but directly undermines the foundation of the
FDA's drug-regulation system. 21 6 Physicians rely on promotional
information to prescribe new drugs, including antibiotics. 21 7 Off-label
promotional information, particularly in the use of detailing, has been
linked to an increase in prescription quantity, but not necessarily
quality, thus perpetuating misuse and overuse. 21 8 Pharmaceutical
companies may argue that banning off-label promotion would not
directly advance the government's interest, because physicians are
able to evaluate the information provided by marketers and do not
21 9
primarily rely on this information when making medical decisions.
However, although physicians generally agree with that contention,
studies confirm that physicians are heavily influenced by marketing,
and their knowledge about any given drug is incomplete. 220 Despite
this, as the Supreme Court noted in Sorrell, fear that speech is too
persuasive is not grounds for its regulation. 221 The Court stated that
Vermont failed to show a clear indication that the detailer's use of
prescriber identifiable information jeopardized the integrity of the
physician-patient relationship. 2 22
Thus, the fact that the

215. See discussion supra Part III.
216. Greene, supra note 10, at 682 ("[I]f drug manufacturers have a First
Amendment right to distribute drugs for any use to physicians or even directly to
patients, then the entire FDCA may well be unconstitutional.") (internal quotations
omitted).
217. See Vukadin, supra note 129, at 81.
218. See id. at 83.
219. Waxman, supra note 113; Kesslheim, supra note 11, at 248-49 (outlining
the role of pharmaceutical marketing in physician decision-making and the response
of pharmaceutical companies).
220. See Waxman, supra note 113; Kesslheim, supra note 11, at 248-49.
221. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011).
222. Id.
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pharmaceutical representatives were persuasive during their sessions
with physicians was insufficient to justify restricting speech.2 23
In contrast to the law in Sorrell, off-label promotion of new
antibiotics does directly jeopardize the physician-patient relationship.
Additionally, off-label promotion perpetuates the public health crisis
of antibiotic resistance because it encourages misuse and overuse.
When a new antibiotic enters the market, physicians have limited
information, the only information on intended uses and effects of the
antibiotics is that printed on the FDA label and contained in the
224
promotional material pharmaceutical sales representatives provide.
Physicians cannot rely on the FDA's review for off-label uses, and
there is no guarantee that an objective review of those uses even
occurred. 225 Off-label promotion is an issue because there could
"easily [be] selective presentation of data [by detailers] intended to
' 226
support the [unapproved] use of the product."
Additionally, off-label promotion is problematic in that it
decreases incentives for pharmaceutical companies to seek additional
FDA approval for off-label uses. 2 2 7 The court in Caronia expressly
recognized that pharmaceutical companies have little incentive to seek
additional approval for off-label uses because the approval process is
expensive. 228 Therefore, restricting marketing behavior is only one
method for the FDA to encourage companies to seek additional
229
approval for additional uses of a new antibiotic.
Regulating the off-label promotion of new antibiotics directly
advances the government's substantial interest of combating the
spread of antibiotic resistance by reducing misuse and overuse.
Restricting the off-label promotion of new antibiotics also encourages
pharmaceutical companies to seek proper FDA approval for additional
uses, maintaining the integrity of the drug-regulatory system.

223. Id. (explaining that the law at issue banned the sale of prescriber
identifying information to pharmaceutical companies for marketing purposes).
224. See Kesselheim, supra note 11, at 248.
225. See id. at 251.
226. Id. at 250.
227. See Greene, supra note 10, at 676.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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3. Specific Restrictionson the Off-Label Promotion of Antibiotics is
PracticallyDrawn to Achieve the Interest of ProtectingPublic Safety
by Addressing Antibiotic Resistance
Allowing the FDA to regulate the off-label promotion of
antibiotics can be narrowly drawn to address the specific concern of
antibiotic resistance. In many cases, courts often deal with general
off-label promotion by finding this element, being narrowly drawn, to
be unsatisfied. 230 However, a suggestion for restricting off-label
promotion of new antibiotics is not a suggestion for a blanket ban on
off-label promotion. These regulations would apply only to the offlabel promotion of new antibiotics.
The regulations proposed here would specifically: (1) allow the
FDA to ban the printing of off-label uses for new antibiotics, unless
that use is currently being approved by the FDA and is accompanied
by a disclaimer; and (2) allow the FDA to ban pharmaceutical sales
representatives from making statements promoting an off-label use of
a new antibiotic. Regulating off-label promotion specifically for new
antibiotics is an important distinction, because off-label promotion
poses specific problems when applied to new antibiotics and antibiotic
resistance. When an antibiotic is promoted-and later prescribedfor an ineffective off-label use, it may add unnecessary selection
pressures that create antibiotic resistance. 2 31
Even without
endangering an individual patient's safety, an improperly prescribed
antibiotic is dangerous to the population at large because of its impact
on the development of antibiotic resistance. 232 In other words, in the
context of antibiotics, it is not the mere threat of danger that this
regulation addresses, but an actual present danger.
The Supreme Court recognizes disclaimers and disclosures as
alternatives to prohibitions on commercial speech. 2 33 Therefore,
courts often suggest disclaimers as viable alternatives to regulating
off-label promotion. 234 However, as Judge Livingston suggested in

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See generally id.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
Kesselheim, supra note 11, at 246.
See Greene, supra note 10, at 683.
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the dissenting opinion in Caronia, disclaimers are often ineffective
and can potentially encourage pharmaceutical companies to bypass the
approval process. 235 To overcome this hurdle, the proposed regulation
of off-label promotion would allow for companies seeking FDA
approval for additional uses to print this information in their
promotional material as long as it is accompanied by a disclaimer.
Allowing oral disclosure is impractical because it is impossible to
enforce. A physician listening to a sales pitch is not listening for an
off-label use and may not know when a disclaimer should have been
made. Furthermore, oral disclosure would be extremely difficult to
enforce since most detailing conversations are not recorded, and it is
difficult for physicians to remember whether a disclaimer was given.
Thus, pharmaceutical companies would not be able to promote offlabel uses of new antibiotics through oral or written statements;
however, if a company is seeking FDA approval for an additional use,
that information would be allowed to be printed with a disclaimer but
would not be permitted to be the centerpiece of the promotional
material. This regulation is not overly broad, because it focuses on
only two types of off-label promotion, only applies to antibiotics,
allows for disclaimers, and is intended to address the serious root
causes of antibiotic resistance-misuse and overuse of new drugs.
CONCLUSION

Fatal bacterial infections are not as ghost-like as they may appear.
Antibiotic resistance is resurrecting these ghosts-and fast. Without
real and practical solutions that address antibiotic resistance, the
problems of our past are poised to become the bane of our future.
Even if current legislation like the GAIN Act achieves its goals and
promotes the production of new antibiotics, without proper control of
off-label promotion, new antibiotics could become just as ineffective
as the ones they replace.
Admittedly, the government cannot directly control how
physicians practice medicine. However, the FDA can control how
pharmaceutical companies promote new antibiotics to physicians.
Because marketing influences how and when physicians prescribe

235. Id.
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drugs, it is essential that the FDA be able to hold pharmaceutical
companies responsible for ensuring that physicians receive accurate
and objectively verifiable information about new antibiotics.
While protecting speech is essential, the nation is currently at risk
of losing effective antibodies to combat infections. The FDA, should
have the power to regulate the content of speech regarding the
promotion of new antibiotics to preserve the efficacy of modem
medicine.
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